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Vladimir Nabokov’s Singular Nature of  Reality:
A Close Reading of  Despair and Bend Sinister
Hannah Kim
Emory University
n Despair and Bend Sinister, Vladimir Nabokov utilizes 
various literary and narrative devices to study consciousness. 
Symbolism, unreliable narrators, and artifice present a 
literary reality that invites the readers to observe how each 
character’s consciousness builds the world it perceives. We 
are also exposed to different consciousness’ imperfections 
through which we are encouraged to reflect on our own 
mental and psychological inclinations. In the end, Nabokov 
points to the entirely individualistic and subjective nature 
of truth and suggests that we might never objectively know 
I
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Truth or Reality because everything we know and perceive 
is filtered through a biased mind. Instead, he stresses the 
importance of being aware of the necessarily unique way 
everyone perceives the world.
In Despair, mirrors symbolize the distorted way 
consciousness often perceives and interprets the world. 
“For Nabokov,” Ellen Pifer comments, “the world is not an 
objective entity but a universe embraced by consciousness” 
(127). In other words, reality does not exist apart from 
the mind that encounters it, and Nabokov compares 
consciousness to a mirror because the world we perceive is 
reflective of our inner world just as a mirror merely reflects 
what is before it. A distorted consciousness, like a colored 
mirror, produces a misrepresented version of reality that 
is colored by certain beliefs, emotions, and prejudices. 
Mirrors also don’t change shape unless shattered; comparing 
our mind to a mirror thus attests to our consciousness’ 
stubbornness as well. 
Within the novel, Hermann’s consciousness is colored 
by his unwavering belief that he has found his doppelgänger, 
and this causes Hermann to see the world entirely differently 
from everyone else. It is interesting to note that he dislikes 
mirrors. “Now that is a word I loathe, that ghastly thing!” 
exclaims Hermann, and he even writes that “the merely 
mention of it has just given [him] a nasty shock” (Despair 
27). Instead of seeing himself and the world as it really is, 
he relies on his own mind which repeatedly produces false 
doubles. Colored by his belief in a doppelgänger, Hermann 
imagines Felix to be his mirror image when really it is only 
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his consciousness reflecting distorted images: “for some ten 
seconds we kept looking into each other’s eyes.  Slowly I 
raised my right arm, but his left did not rise, as I had almost 
expected to do. I closed my left eye, but both his eyes 
remained open” (Despair 20). When he does encounter a 
true mirror, Hermann convinces himself that the reflection 
he sees is not himself, but Felix: “when at last I got back to 
my hotel room, I found there, amid mercurial shadows and 
framed in frizzly bronze, Felix awaiting me. Pale-faced and 
solemn he drew near. He was now well-shaven” (Despair 
22). 
Hermann’s repeated denial of Felix’s uniqueness 
dramatizes the subjective nature of reality in Despair. We see 
that Hermann had been aware of their physical differences 
from the beginning:
I possess large yellowish teeth; his are whiter and set 
more closely together, but is that really important? 
On my forehead a vein stands out like a capital M 
imperfectly drawn, but when I sleep my brow is as 
smooth as that of my double.  And those ears… the 
convolutions of his are but very slightly altered in 
comparison with mine: here more compressed, there 
smoothed out. We have eyes of the same shape, 
narrowly slit with sparse lashes, but his iris is paler 
than mine. (Despair 24)
Though he himself observes certain facial differences, 
Hermann insists that they are the same person. Again and 
again he considers the possibility that Felix might not 
be his double—“who knows, maybe he was not the least 
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like me after all” — but Hermann always returns to his 
original disposition (Despair 88). His ability to perceive 
Felix as his double while contrary evidence abound shows 
that “every item perceived by Nabokov’s narrators and 
protagonists similarly acts as a mirror of the observation of 
consciousness” (Pifer 127). In other words, what Hermann 
sees and fails to see are not indicative of what his sensory 
abilities are capable of, but what his consciousness is 
desirous of. This is why Hermann’s use of the phrase “to 
my eyes” is so important because it was his desire to see a 
doppelgänger that his eyes responded to (Despair 21). 
Hermann believing Felix to be his identical twin is 
not an isolated, one-time mistake because we see that his 
consciousness idealizes doubles and produces them over 
and over again. When travelling through a foreign town 
to meet Felix again, Hermann comes across what he takes 
to be one of Ardalion’s pictures and asks the store owner 
how she came to attain it. When she replies that her niece 
painted it, Hermann thinks “[W]ell, I’m damned! For had 
I not seen something very similar, if not identical, among 
Ardalion’s pictures?” (Despair 65) However, Hermann later 
discovers that the painting’s subjects are “not quite two 
roses and not quite a pipe, but a couple of large peaches 
and a glass ashtray” (Despair 93). Similarly, Hermann is 
prone to thinking that every face looks, more or less, the 
same. When Ardalion asserts that “every face is unique,” 
Hermann retorts “Well, now, really—unique! … Isn’t that 
going too far? Take for instance the definite types of human 
faces that exist in the world; say, zoological types. There are 
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people with the features of apes; there is also the rat type, 
the swine type. Then take the resemblance to celebrities…” 
(Despair 43). Instead of perceiving individual differences 
in people, Hermann is busy categorizing. When he shares 
that he “longed passionately for [Ardalion] to start talking 
about doubles,” we observe that mirror image is a deep-
rooted obsession with Hermann—a tint to his mirror of 
consciousness (Despair 43). 
In addition to mirror symbolisms, Nabokov also employs 
an unreliable narrator to further suggest that consciousness 
is often misleading. In the introduction of Despair, Nabokov 
calls Hermann, our lying and exaggerating narrator, a 
“neurotic scoundrel” (Despair 11). From the very first 
sentence of the novel we can see Hermann’s inconsistent 
personality: “If I were not perfectly sure of my power to 
write and of my marvelous ability to express ideas with the 
utmost grace and vividness… So, more or less, I had thought 
of beginning of my tale” (Despair 13). The sentence lacks 
the “utmost grace” and logic that Hermann professes to 
possess, and the awkward phrases such as “well, as I was 
saying” and “I think I ought to inform the reader” insinuate 
that Hermann is not, in fact, perfectly sure of his literary 
talent (Despair 14). We also see that Hermann has no qualms 
about lying when he confesses, “[T]hat bit about my mother 
was a deliberate lie […] I could, of course have crossed it 
out, but I purposely leave it there as a sample of one of my 
essential traits: my light-hearted, inspired lying” (Despair 
14). Lastly, Hermann seems to acknowledge that his writing 
is imperfect and unreliable because he is writing from 
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memory: 
The pines sought gently, snow lay about, with bald 
patches of soil showing black. What nonsense! How 
could there by snow in June? Ought to be crossed  
out, were it not wicked to erase; for the real author 
is not I, but my impatient         memory. Understand 
it just as you please; it is none of my business. 
(Despair 41)
It is particularly insightful for Hermann to have noticed 
that it is not his being itself narrating but his flawed and 
biased memory retracing the story. Indeed, it is our unique 
consciousness that stumbles upon the world to make sense 
of whatever it encounters. Furthermore, since all minds have 
different inclinations, bias and errors are to be expected. 
 Lastly, Nabokov uses humorous cases of extreme 
situational irony to convey how the folly of our 
consciousness can be comical at times. To the end Hermann 
refuses to believe that his “art,” or the foolish murder of 
Felix, has failed because he and Felix bear no resemblance. 
Instead, he complains,“[A]ll that disgusting mess is due 
to the inertia, pigheadedness, prejudice of humans, failing 
to recognize me in the corpse of my flawless double” 
(Despair 162). Of course, this is extremely ironic because 
it was precisely this stubborn bias of his mind that led him 
to his demise. Similarly, when first encountering Felix, 
Hermann comments that it would only be “the partiality 
and fallaciousness of human eyesight” that would lead 
others to miss their resemblance (Despair 19). Through 
these comically ironic situations, Nabokov comments on the 
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inherent difficulty consciousness faces in becoming aware of 
its own limitations. 
If mirrors in Despair express consciousness’ tendency 
to project whatever is already within itself, liquids in Bend 
Sinister reflect consciousness’ fluid nature. The motif of 
liquid blots reoccurs throughout the novel. The very first 
scene in the book contains an oblong puddle, and the 
subsequent chapter takes place over a bridge where Krug 
feels “an intimate connection with the black lacquered 
water lapping and heaving under the stone arches of the 
bridge” (Bend Sinister 14). Here, the black “heaving” water 
seems to reflect Krug’s own self, a gloomy man who had 
been crying and struggling. The liquid imagery returns 
again when Dr. Alexander’s pen bleeds ink and Krug sees 
the ink blot, “a fancy footprint or the spatulate outline of a 
puddle” (Bend Sinister 50). Lastly, Skotoma, the founder of 
Ekwilism, makes explicit the comparison between human 
consciousness, liquid, and container:
Human beings, he said, were so many vessels 
containing unequal portions of this essentially 
uniform consciousness. It was, however, quite 
possible, he maintained, to regulate the capacity 
of the human vessels […] either by grading the 
contents or by eliminating the fancy vessels and 
adopting a standard size. (Bend Sinister 68)
Because he believed consciousness to be fluid and 
malleable, Skotoma strove to regulate the shape of 
consciousness by limiting the “vessels”—people’s beliefs, 
emotions, and expressions. 
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In Krug’s case, everything he experiences is molded 
according to his prevailing grief, just as everything Hermann 
sees is colored by his belief in a doppelgänger. Krug asserts 
in the beginning that “the operation has not been successful 
and [that his] wife will die” (Bend Sinister 6). The despair 
resulting from this tragic occasion proceeds to affect 
everything Krug observes. For instance, illusions of Olga 
flash across Krug’s mind while he is crossing the bridge: 
“Suddenly, with the vividness of a praedormital image or 
of a bright-robed lady on stained glass, she drifted across 
his retina, in profile, carrying something[…] and the wall 
dissolved, the torrent was loosed again” (Bend Sinister 13). 
The ink blot Krug observes from Dr. Alexander’s pen takes 
the shape of a puddle, the first thing Krug observed when 
looking outside the hospital window after Olga’s death. 
Similarly, when Paduk spills milk by knocking down the 
tumbler, “what was left of the milk made a kidney-shaped 
white puddle on the desk” (Bend Sinister 132). Kidney 
failure, of course, was the cause of Olga’s death, and the 
puddle image returns again and again. “The world Krug 
perceives,” Pifer explains, “is a psychic landscape, centered 
about his own preoccupations and concerns […] Everything 
Krug perceives is transmuted and infused by the grief, the 
love, the loss he experiences at Olga’s death” (81). Thus 
in Bend Sinister, the ever-conforming liquid motif reveals 
the workings of Krug’s consciousness— his affected mind 
whose perception of the world is conditioned by his despair. 
 Furthermore, by suggesting that it was Krug’s 
mental state that brought about his own demise, Nabokov 
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points to the danger of not being aware of the way one’s 
consciousness interprets the world. As an academic, Krug 
is always trying to reason the world out, and he fails to 
understand the brutality of the Ekwilist regime simply 
because he does not perceive its legitimacy. “My dear 
friend, you know well my esteem for you,” President 
Azureus pleads, “but you are a dreamer, a thinker. You do 
not realize the circumstances” (Bend Sinister 47). Instead 
of considering the dangers of Paduk’s regime, Krug holds 
onto his stubborn belief that he is somehow untouchable. 
His obliviousness is a partial result of his childhood 
memory of bullying Paduk. Krug recalls that “toad was 
[Paduk’s] nickname,” confessing that he was “something 
of a bully” who used to “trip [Paduk] up and sit upon his 
face” (Bend Sinister 46). Krug’s heavy reliance on the past 
manifests itself through his unwillingness to pay the proper 
respect to Paduk during his interview. Alarmed by Krug’s 
condescending manner, the surrounding guards warn that 
“this is still not the right manner” and that he “should bear in 
mind that notwithstanding the narrow and fragile bridge of 
school memories uniting the two sides, these are separated 
in depth by an abyss of power and dignity which even a 
great philosopher cannot hope to measure” (Bend Sinister 
129). Though he is ordered not to “indulge in this atrocious 
familiarity,” Krug continues to anger Paduk and the guards 
(Bend Sinister 129). 
Krug’s pride, philosophic tendencies, and apathy make 
it difficult for Krug to protect himself and David from 
Paduk’s totalitarian government. Indeed, Krug is unable 
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to foresee David’s impending danger despite the obvious 
hints. Entrenched in his own perception of reality, Krug 
entirely disregards others’ reality—Paduk’s and President 
Azerues’, among others— and brings about his own 
tragic end. Laurie Clancy aptly observes that “although 
[Nabokov’s] sympathies are patently with Krug, the author 
is nevertheless careful to point out the flaws in Krug’s 
greatness—his arrogance and foolish conviction of his own 
safety and failure to see how his presence endangers his 
friends” (96). For instance, though Krug has had the chance 
to escape the country, he delays for no apparent reason. By 
blinding Krug to the well-apparent fact that Mariette is a spy, 
Nabokov exposes how illogical our minds can be when we 
are insistent upon our own reality. The able reader is quick to 
pick up on Marietta’s suspicious motives given that she had 
worked for a well-known artist until he suddenly was sent to 
a prison camp, not to mention that she randomly shows up at 
Krug’s door. Even Krug’s intuition seems to respond to these 
hints when he comments that “there was something rather 
irritating about her,” but he fails to act upon it (Bend Sinister 
123). Thus Nabokov suggests that it is not enough merely to 
know that our consciousness is biased; one should at least 
have a faint idea of one’s own inclinations if one wishes to 
avoid Hermann and Krug’s fate. 
Nabokov also dramatizes the unreliable and artificial 
nature of reality in Bend Sinister by robbing his characters 
of autonomy; the use of artifice reminds the reader that there 
is no objective reality. The narrator repeatedly makes his 
presence felt by calling Krug his “favorite character” and 
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by employing changes in narrative voices (135). The reality 
in Bend Sinister is full of shifting perspectives. Whereas 
the first chapter begins with Krug’s first-person narrative, 
the second chapter switches to an omniscient third person 
narrator that observes Krug. The change in gaze, voice, and 
awareness between “my wife will die” and “Krug halted 
in the doorway” conveys that there are always at least two 
different angles to any given reality (Bend Sinister 7). The 
shifting identity of narrative voices makes it difficult for 
the reader to clearly distinguish between what is real and 
what is imagined in the novel (Clancy 95). The narrator 
also provides the reader with multiple versions of the story; 
after describing Krug’s meeting with Paduk, the narrator 
interrupts, “[N]o, it did not go on quite like that. In the 
first place Paduk was silent during most of the interview” 
(Bend Sinister 131). Nabokov even addresses Krug directly 
towards the end of the novel when he writes: “the echoing 
steps retreated. Silence. Now, at last, you may think” (202). 
By repeatedly disrupting the seemingly real world of Bend 
Sinister, Nabokov suggests that the world we live in, like 
Krug’s world, is entirely dependent on human consciousness. 
The biggest authorial intervention occurs at the end of 
the novel when Krug finds that he is a mere character at the 
whim of the narrator, and it is important for us to note that 
our position is not too different from Krug’s; we, too, are 
at the whims of the universe and our own consciousness 
and will therefore never truly and objectively understand 
reality. Towards the end of Bend Sinister, the narrator shares 
that he “felt a pang of pity for Adam and slid towards him 
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along an inclined beam of pale light—causing instantaneous 
madness” (203). This madness opens Krug’s eyes to the 
“simple reality” that “he and his son and wife and everybody 
else are merely [Nabokov]’s whims,” that everything is “only 
absurd mirages, illusions oppressive to Krug during his brief 
spell of being” (Bend Sinister vii). Aware of the true nature 
of his existence, Krug cries, “[Y]ou silly people […] what on 
earth are you afraid of? What does it all matter? Ridiculous! 
Same as those infantile pleasures—Olga and the boy taking 
part in some silly theatricals, she getting drowned, he losing 
his life or something in a railway accident. What on earth 
does it matter?” (Bend Sinister 206) The narrator even saves 
Krug from dying by suddenly putting an end to the novel, 
an artifice Nabokov describes as “slippery sophism, a play 
upon words” (210). However, Nabokov does not employ 
these extreme interventions solely to exercise his omnipotent 
power as the creator or even to take the easy way out. 
Instead, by using artifice to create a dream-like world where 
illusion and reality overlap, Nabokov invites the reader to 
compare his reality to that of Krug’s:
The origins of our existence are ultimately 
mysterious, remaining beyond the reach of the words 
we summon to define and describe. Hedged by the 
unknown surrounding us, we struggle, like Adam 
Krug, to peer beyond the limits of our condition, 
seeking to populate the terrifyingly empty spaces 
with our words and images. (Pifer 95)
By witnessing Krug’s lack of autonomy, we become 
aware of the possibility that our reality, too, is never 
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concrete, independent, and objective.
In the end, symbolism, unreliable narrators, and 
artifice in Despair and Bend Sinister show that life is a 
series of biased impressions and that every consciousness 
is necessarily singular. Each consciousness builds the 
individual’s world, and this is why the unique nature of 
consciousness is crucial; there is no such thing as average 
reality because our subjective minds render it impossible 
for us to grasp the objective truth—if there is any at all. 
Both novels uphold the supremacy of the individual 
consciousness, no matter how imperfect it may be. Lastly, 
because each individual consciousness is unique, to ignore 
or suppress someone’s consciousness is to wipe out his or 
her world and existence. Nabokov seems to speak directly 
through Ardalion in Despair: “in the whole world there 
are not, and cannot be, two men alike, however well you 
disguise them” (Despair 170). Nabokov defends every 
consciousness’ singularity, and it is only the deranged or the 
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